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opinion gives the feeling for the p eri od and of earlier and subsequent periods, and
which I would recommend that intereste d p ersons should read, possibly skipping
some of the other parts. Page 330 has the following summation: "By 1585, then
the works of Paracelsus and his followers were widely disseminated and activel;
studied by bo t h laymen and medical practi t ioners. Practical che mistry was a popular pursuit. In this context it is not surprising that Paracelsianism made a major
impact on the vernacular me dical literature produced . in the last quarter of the
16th century.
Chapter 10 by J e rome J. Bylebyl is entitled "The School of Padu a: Humanistic
Medicine in t he 16t h Century." This c hapter discusses primarily Italian medical
educ ation a nd points out that the strength of Italia n medical education was not in
t h e lectures but in the system of practical instruction in the hospitals, which
apparently only the Italia n sc hools had du ring that period. The emphasis is on
Pa du a (near Venice) and on Bologna. Many foreign stude nts came to the Italian
schools not for the lectures but for the practical demonstrations which fre quently
were give n by very astute clinicians.
It is really on this note of a background to modern medical e ducation that the
major part of the volum e ends. This chapter 10 would be the third I would recommend that one read, along with chapters 5 and 9 . I think these would very well , in
a shorter length , give the flavor of the whole book.
The last chapter is a short biography and discussion of the contributions of
Sanford Vincent Larkey (1898-1969) to whom the volume is de dicate d . A major
figure in m e dica l history, he stimulated c ontinuing work on the history of medicine a nd its major effects on and in our time.
All in all , the book is interesting. While parts of it are somewhat weighted
down with statistics, it has much relevant comment on life in the 16th century.
Perhaps it is we ll to close a review of a work on the history of medicine with the
paraphrase d thought that one real reason for paying attention to history is that
"those who do not know history are condemned to repeat it." I find this chronicle of a period of m edical history humanly interesting and worthwhile on its own
grounds, and recommend it to the m e dical bibliophile.
- Chesley P. Erwin, M.D.
Milwaukee County General Hospital

Genetic Counseling: Facts, Values, and Norms
Alexander M. Capron et aI., Editors
Alan R. Liss, Publisher, 150-5th Ave., New York, N.Y. 10011, 1 979, xii+ 344pp.
Capron et al. have assembled a series of articles exploring the historical roots,
t h e theoretical underpinnings, t he p ract ical organization, and the moral, social a nd
legal implications of genetic counseling. Their aim is to present an interdisciplinary analysis of an exa mple of applied science. Such an e nterprise , they claim,
requires 1) "accurate dat a upon which to re fl ect" (p. 1); 2) "teste d and well
wrought techniques of argument" from norm ative disc iplines (p. 1) ; and
3) "shared a nd counterpoised reasonings of scientists and humanists" (p. 1).
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Such an enterprise is to be encouraged as a remedy for the single-sightedness
that specialization often engenders. This book is, indeed, very valuable for the
problems it raises. However, evaluating the ed itors' endeavor in terms of their
stated aims, t hey have not quite succeeded. The diversity of views needed for such
"counterpoised reasoning" is lacking on many substantive issues of primary
importance and their argument techniques are often lack ing. In fairness to the
authors, though, it must be said that some of the requisite analyses may be
uncommon in the literature because of the relative infancy of theoretical reflection on some of these issues.
The uncovering of the historical roots of genetic counseling is done by Caplan
(p. 21) in a succinct summary that details the conceptual confusions that had to
be clarified before a science of human genetics could exist. Similar problems, he
thinks, may be hinderi ng the integration of general population genetics into the
science of human genetics. However, it is not clear that it will be theoretically possible or morally desirable to take this point of view . As Caplan himself notes, population biology is in a paradoxical predicament - theories that would be manageable are manifestly inapplicable to actual populations, and theories that would be
applicable are too complex to be manageable. Caplan might be a bit too optimistic
over the fruitfulness of these abstract mathematical models in biology as well as
over the possibility of this complexity problem being solved. Furthermore, it is
not clear that it would be morally desirable to view human genetics in this way.
Might it not tend to submerge the individual - whether normal or handicapped to the betterment of the species? Indeed, Twiss argues that from a historical
perspective , a counselor seems "duty bound to point out the sociomoral and
eugenic significance of the genetic problems" (p. 204). The legitimacy of the
eugenic aim seems to represent an underlying consensus among most of the
authors. I will return to this shortly in my discussion of the valuative implications
of genetic counseling.
Other articles deal with the scientific, metaphysical, and epistemological underpinnings of the concept of genetic disease. On these topics, the requisite diversity
of opinion seems to be lacking. They correctly emphasize that nongenetic diseases
have genetic components and that genetic diseases usually have environmental
components from the genetic, somatic, phenotypic, social, and ecological environment. The conclusion most often drawn is that the distinction between genetic
and nongenetic disease is untenable . Scientifically, no mention is made of the current lack of understanding of the regulation of gene action as helping to maintain
a separation of environmental and genetic factors . Metaphysically, what seems to
be underlying these views is a mechanistic view of the organism that fails to
apprec iate 1) the irreducible func tional nature of biological systems and 2) the
multil evel interactions such systems require. Many of the causal ambiguities they
discuss could be removed once one realizes that in biological systems, alternative
means can be taken to realize a given function. Epistemologically, the assumption
seems to be made, especially by Hull (p . 57), that either one must id entify the
total cause of a disease or arbitrarily isolate one factor as the cause . But, where
would one stop in iden tifying the total cause? Is this even a legitimate concept? In
biological systems, the cause is identified more by its role within the context of
the functioning whole. This consideration is masked by talking solely about necessary and sufficient conditions. These considerations predispose one to take a
mechanistic view rather than a more functional one.
The practical organization of genetic counseling is considered in both a descriptive and a functional sense. One of two orientations is taken by a practicing counselor. Predominantly, these counselors take their aim to be disease prevention.
The other less common orientation takes the values of the counselee as the basic
parameters for a decision . It is unfortunate, as Sorenson and Culbert note (p. 85),
that very little work has been done on the effect of these two different modes of
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counseling on the counselee. Genetic counseling takes place within the context of
a host of cognitive, affective, deliberative, conative, and moral factors. The proble m is to decide which of these is the special province of the counselor. Ought one
person address himself to all these, or to only some?
When the moral, social, and legal implications of genetic counseling are considered, there is again less diversity than one might wish . The general consensus is
that prevention, defined in terms of abortion, is morally permissible. Sidney Callahan argues for the point despite the fact that she emphasizes the intrinsic value
of the child (p. 217). Viability is emphasized as the basis for granting rights to the
fetus despite its totally arbitrary natu re. Nowhere is the intrinsic value of life nor
the deep experience of love that can develop between a disabled individual and his
parents or guardians given much serious consideration. Even though some authors
point out the real possibility of misdiagnosis , the most they argue for is a need to
inform the counsellee of this possibility. What is lacking is a type of counseling
context that does not recognize the legitimacy of preventive abortions and that
emphasizes the use of diagnosis for alerting parents and either preparing them for
their special responsibilities or helping them to make arrangements for others to
assume these responsibilities. The day in which we will be able to remedy such
defects is still down the road. The underlying eugenic aims of genetic counseling
are most evident here. To count a person whose instruments of agency have been
impaired by misfortune as of no value is the height of injustice.
In examining the moral, legal, and social implications of genetic counseling, too
much space is devoted to summary and exposition and not enough to solid argument. There seems to be an underlying skepticism concerning the objectivity of
philosophical knowledge . How can these writers be so certain of this skepticism
since skepticism in this regard is itself a philosophical position ? Related to this is a
recurrent pattern of argument. Too often, two extreme views are formulated, a
middle view is developed , and it is assumed that the middle view is more reasonable. There is no reason to believe this. It could just as well be - and most often in
the case of abortion is - that this middle position is a combination of inconsistent
principles.
Lastly, I would suggest that the experienced reader ask himself whether too
much emphasis was placed on the most extreme genetic diseases in the cases
presented for consideration.

- Michael Green, Ph .D .
Assistant Professor of Philosophy
Marquette University
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